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Motivated by the cost reductions and outcome improvements generated by benchmarking in many in-
dustries, we focus on in-country global health programs to identify and quantify opportunities for
process improvement. We empirically study the major efﬁciency drivers of reproductive health (RH)
country programs in Sub-Saharan Africa sponsored by international funding organizations. To ensure a
level playing ﬁeld for comparison across countries, we quantify the impact of cross-country heteroge-
neity and random shocks on the efﬁciency of RH programs. To analyze these relationships and isolate the
effects attributable to managerial inefﬁciency, we use a three-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)/
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) model. We show the impact of environmental factors on program
efﬁciency, linking policy making decisions with operational and health outcome performance. We also
show that donor fragmentation negatively impacts managerial efﬁciency, and we suggest actions to
mitigate this effect. We then provide a way to improve performance through benchmarking efforts
within groups of countries and present an initial prototype of such efforts.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Resource constraints and the high burden of infectious diseases
in many low-income and middle-income countries require do-
mestic government health expenditure to be complemented with
overseas ﬁnancial assistance. This assistance may be in the form of
provision of health commodities or other health ﬁnancing. In 2010,
the total donor investments in global health were approximately
$28.2 billion.1 In Sub-Saharan Africa, where the resource con-
straints are the severest and the disease burden the highest,
approximately $8.1 billion was spent on health programs.
Most donors require an assessment of the deployment and
performance improvements resulting from their investments.
However, the evaluation metrics differ across donor organizations.
In recent years, measuring and improving the performance of
developing country health programs funded by global monies has
become a major concern of funding agencies and policymakers
(Glassman et al., 2013). Performance-based ﬁnancing systems,renguer), aiyer@purdue.edu
n, 2013.
B.V. This is an open access article uwhere future donations are conditioned on predeﬁned results, are
used by global health agencies to improve performance (e.g. GAVI2
and USAID3). However such systems are complex and do not always
adequately convey incentives for performance improvement (Fan
et al., 2013). Common issues impacting the effectiveness of these
performance systems are the selection of appropriate performance
metrics and the lack of considerations of location-speciﬁc factors
that can partially affect performance (Eichler and Levine, 2009).
Furthermore, a systematic evaluation approach, that is replicable
and comprehensible to all stakeholders, is the perfect candidate, as
expressed by studies from different funding organizations (Clark
et al., 2004; OECD, 2008; Roberts and Khattri, 2012). Additionally,
and in the context of donors funding health programs in multiple
countries, this evaluation approach needs to be coupled with a
benchmarking technique that allows to compare different coun-
tries' efﬁciencies as a source to provide realistic best practices for
efﬁciency improvement and achievement of performance targets.
In this paper, we contribute to the global health supply chain
literature by providing a replicable, fair and rigorous approach to2 http://www.gavi.org/about/governance/gavi-board/minutes/2011/16-nov/mi-
nutes/performance-based-funding.
3 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadw113.pdf.
nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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grams. We deﬁne managerial efﬁciency as the capability of in-
country program managers to efﬁciently run their operations. Us-
ing reproductive health (RH) programs as an example, our
approach considers both health and supply chain outcomes and
allows us to isolate each country's managerial inefﬁciencies from
inefﬁciencies that are attributable to different countries endowed
environmental factors such as logistics infrastructure, location, and
public health care status. This enables a fair estimation of mana-
gerial efﬁciencies, where good environmental conditions cannot
disguise inefﬁcient program management and bad environmental
conditions cannot hide efﬁcient program management. Our study
provides an estimate of the impact of changes to these environ-
mental factors to improve overall efﬁciencies. We also quantita-
tively analyze the possible inﬂuence of donor fragmentation (i.e.
number of different funders) on managerial efﬁciency. The latter
impact has barely been tested empirically before.
The modeling approach suggested is a three-stage Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA)/Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) bench-
marking methodology to the RH data at a country-level, which is the
level at which donors evaluate performance. This technique allows
us to analyze efﬁciency using different sets of variables: input vari-
ables, output variables, environmental variables and variables that
inﬂuence random shocks and managerial inefﬁciency. Our method
quantiﬁes (overall) efﬁciency obtained in stage 1 and, after recali-
brations related to exogenous effects in stage 2, it quantiﬁes mana-
gerial efﬁciency in stage 3. Finally, this method allows us to compare
each country's performance with other peer countries, and thus
determine ways that can help a country achieve relative perfor-
mance improvement. We do so by describing a methodology to ﬁnd
each country's reference and extended reference set and suggesting
a benchmarking process that could help identify speciﬁc supply
chain and operational best practices. This approach is foreshadowed
in a case study based on Botswana and Lesotho. To the best of our
knowledge, the current study is the ﬁrst to employ a DEA/SFA multi-
stage technique to evaluate efﬁciency of global health programswith
a commodity/product focus.
2. Literature review
Our modeling approach is based on Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA), which is a nonparametric linear programming method that
was initially developed by Farrell (1957) and Charnes et al. (1978).
DEA uses linear programming to permit individual DecisionMaking
Units (DMUs) to chooseweights associatedwith inputs and outputs
that would maximize their efﬁciency. In the context of our study, a
DMU refers to a country set of all RH programs. In DEA, a country
aggregated efﬁciency is estimated as a non-parametric relationship
between the set of outputs and inputs. Applying DEA across all
DMUs provides an efﬁcient frontier of performance. This frontier
suggests different weighted combinations of inputs and outputs
that can enable the maximum possible level of efﬁciency.
The DEA technique has been employed in many industries,
including the health care delivery industry (Hollingsworth, 2008)
and at different DMU levels, from hospitals (Cooper et al., 2007;
Jacobs, 2001) and nursing homes (Bj€orkgren et al., 2001; Ozcan,
1998) to physicians (Chilingerian, 1995). To our knowledge, our pa-
per is the only one to use DEA techniques to evaluate health care
programs performance at the country level. The closest to our work
from all DEA studies are some recent papers that assess the efﬁciency
of hospitals in developing countries. For example, Masiye (2007)
demonstrated that costs could be lowered by up to 36% without
compromising output for a set of Zambian hospitals using DEA.
Regular DEA techniques do not allow to disentangle the effects
of endowed environmental factors, random shocks, and managerialefﬁciency on the overall performance of a DMU, as is the purpose of
our paper. The closest method that allows for this is DEA with
uncontrollable or non-discretionary variables. However, this
method assumes that the direction of inﬂuence on efﬁciency of
each one of these variables is known in advance. Other two-stage
models have been suggested to avoid to pre-test directions, how-
ever random shocks (i.e., luck factor and statistical noise) are not
accounted for in any of these methods (Cooper et al., 2007). To
account for all these factors, Fried et al. (2002) deﬁne a three-stage
DEA/SFA framework, where the ﬁrst stage consist of running DEA
with a set of input and output variables. In stage 2 the SFA tech-
nique is used to regress the ﬁrst stage inefﬁciency slack values
decomposing them in three attributable factors: environmental
effects, random shocks andmanagerial inefﬁciency. Stage 3 consists
of running DEA againwith adjusted input and/or output values that
only account for managerial inefﬁciencies. This work uses an input-
oriented BCC (Banker-Charles-Cooper) as the DEA model of choice
and the DMUs are a set of US-hospital afﬁliated nursing homes.
Other papers have proposed reﬁnements of this multi-stage
method. For example, Avkiran and Rowlands (2008) suggests a
different DEA technique, the non-oriented Slacks-Based Measure
(SBM) model, claiming that this type of DEA model is fully unit-
invariant and thus more consistent with the use of slacks in the
SFA estimates of stage 2. This paper also suggests a different
adjustment formula to transition from stage 2 to stage 3 that
directly accounts for the impact of environmental factors and sta-
tistical noise. Liu and Tone (2008) builds upon these developments
to further improve stage 2 by following Battese and Coelli (1995)
regression formulation and Greene (2008) speciﬁcations in the
variance equations of the composed error.
As already mentioned, Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is
another well-known performance evaluation method. Speciﬁcally,
SFA is a parametric regression-based method for estimating the
product efﬁciency frontier developed by Aigner et al. (1977). This
technique requires the speciﬁcation of functional form to deﬁne ef-
ﬁciency and speciﬁcation of distributional form for the inefﬁciency
term, and it provides random error terms and inefﬁciency residuals.
These error terms allow to account for noise assigning part of the
deviations of the frontier to aspects that are not necessarily linked to
managerial inefﬁciencies. SFA has been extensively used in the
context of evaluating cross-country health programs. For example, a
World Health Organization (WHO) report used SFA to study the
national health care system's efﬁciency of 191 countries using WHO
data (WHO, 2000). This report generated discussions between ex-
perts in health economics regarding the appropriateness of the
methodology. For example Greene (2004) employed the same data
to provide a more general SFA study that would distinguish between
inefﬁciency and cross individual heterogeneity, claiming that the
later wasmasqueraded in the initial study. Ourmethod of choice, the
three stage DEA/SFA technique, takes advantage of the beneﬁts of
SFA that account for these random shocks and environmental effects
and the DEA beneﬁts that allow the creation of reference sets to
benchmark across different DMUs.
Other techniques besides DEA, SFA or muti-stage DEA-SFA have
been used to evaluate performance of health programs. These
techniques can be grouped in cost analysis methods (e.g., cost-
effectiveness, cost-utility, cost-beneﬁt analysis) and tend to be
more direct methods and thus easier to comprehend (Drummond,
2005; Johannesson, 1996). However, they cannot provide a quan-
titative impact analysis of random shocks, environmental variables
or funding concentration as we are obtaining in our work. One
example of a practical cost analysis study across countries has been
run by the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) that
attempts to assess the performance of their programs by using fa-
cility expenditure tracking to identify outliers (Sangrujee, 2012).
4 In fact, our measure is timeliness, the opposite of lead time, because any DEA
output variable should have a positive relationship with efﬁciency.
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sons such as location, population, or infrastructure costs or because
of performance gaps.
3. Discussion on major efﬁciency drivers of global health
programs
In this section we discuss the major drivers that can affect efﬁ-
ciency of global health programs for developing countries. These
drivers are in the form of DEA input and output variables (3.1),
environmental factors (3.2), and funding concentration (3.3).
3.1. Input and output variables
We base the selection of input and output variables for DEA
analysis on three criteria. One is the focus on the managerial efﬁ-
ciency of the delivery coordination between donors and country-
level managers and its impact on the in-country downstream
process. Another criteria is the consideration of both supply chain
and health outcomes metrics as comprehensive performance
metrics for global health supply chains (Glassman et al., 2013). The
last criteria is the pursuit of simplicity in variable selection (Eichler
and Levine, 2009). The latter criteria is reﬂected in the selection of
only three variables: landed costs as input variable and two output
variables, Supply Timeliness being an indicator of operational pro-
cess performance and Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR) a health
outcome indicator for RH supply chains. Cost is a straightforward
measure to represent observed expense of resources. Our speciﬁc
input variable is landed costs of contraceptive deliveries per capita.
We deﬁne supply timeliness as the number of days between the
average transit delay of the country at hand and the average transit
delay of the country of the sample with the largest transit delay.
CPR of modern methods is deﬁned as the proportion of women of
reproductive age who are married or in a union and who are
currently using (or whose partner is using) a modern contraceptive
method. Of the possible measures of RH outcomes that have been
used in the literature (such as adolescent birth rate, unmet need for
family planning and undesired fertility rate, etc.) (Loaiza and Blake,
2010), we select CPR of modern methods as our health outcome
variable because it directly captures the usage and availability of
the delivered products and there is a reasonably complete current
data set across our country set. These three chosen DEA variables
are described in detail in Appendix A. Summary statistics are also
provided in the online supplement (Table S1).
3.2. The impact of environmental factors on efﬁciency
The performance of a DMU relative to the maximum achievable
efﬁciency is dependent on its level of input resources and output
values. Nonetheless, researchers are aware that there are other
phenomena that inﬂuence these input and output values besides
managerial competence. The DMUs in this study are the countries,
where each country is represented by a set of country-level RH
programs. Some countries will have a unique programwhile others
will have multiple programs. To generate a fair comparison across
countries, country level factors that are not within the control of
the program managers of the DMU should be considered exoge-
nous, but should be controlled for, when assessing managerial ef-
ﬁciency. Typically, exogenous variables are classiﬁed as
representing environmental factors and random shocks (Fried et al.,
2002). While random shocks are arbitrary phenomena out of the
control of anyone (e.g., good and bad luck, natural disasters,
omitted variables, or statistical noise), environmental factors
deserve special attention because they are under the control of
other authorities and efﬁciency can be potentially improved ifresources are devoted to modify these factors.
In the context of measuring health care delivery efﬁciency at the
country level, the impact of cross-country heterogeneity has been
studied (WHO, 2000). Evans et al. (2001) claimed that income per
capita does not directly contribute to health outcomes, but sug-
gested other measures of health expenditure and education. Other
authors question this claim and ﬁnd persistent signiﬁcance be-
tween income per capita (measured by GDP per capita) and in-
efﬁciency (Gravelle et al., 2003; Greene, 2004). Given this debate,
we include GDP per capita and public health expenditure as po-
tential environmental variables of our analysis.
Next, we consider potential environmental factors that can
impact our two output variables. The relationship between female
education and contraceptive use is well-established by studies that
use the demographic health survey (DHS) and are centered on Sub-
Saharan Africa (Ainsworth et al., 1996; Kravdal, 2002). The socio-
economic factors most commonly used to study the uptake of
modern contraceptive methods are parity, education, and house-
hold socioeconomic status factors Stephenson et al. (2007). Since
GDP per capita is already included in our pool of environmental
factors, we use a proxy for education (adult female literacy) as
potential environmental factor that might impact efﬁciency.
A measure of lead time is our second output measure.4 Empir-
ical studies show a link between lead time performance and factors
such as information technology and process improvement (Ward
and Zhou, 2006). Furthermore, researchers claim that a country's
logistics performance index (LPI) (Hausman et al., 2013) and
whether the country is landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007) affect total
landed costs (our input variable). Given this background, we select
three additional environmental factors that can potentially impact
efﬁciency: LPI, a proxy of trade level (merchandise index), and a
proxy of location (landlocked country or not).
All the cited literature suggests that there might be a signiﬁcant
impact of environmental factors on efﬁciency in the context of our
data sets. We claim it is vitally important to understand this impact
and compensate for it in order to develop a fair process to compare
managerial performance across countries as stated earlier. To un-
derstand the signiﬁcance of these environmental variables and es-
timate magnitude of its impact, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Environmental factors have a signiﬁcant impact on
efﬁciency of RH programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.
We claim that this hypothesis represents the ﬁrst step towards a
fair process to isolating managerial inefﬁciency and provide our
DMUs with useful insights for improvement. We also claim that, if
this hypothesis is validated, policy agendas focused on changing
environmental factors can improve RH program efﬁciency.
3.3. The impact of funding concentration on managerial efﬁciency
There is an increasing number of donors involved in health
programs, where smaller amounts of aid are managed by more
donors. Naturally, if efforts are not coordinated the efﬁciency, eq-
uity and effectiveness of these programs will suffer (Buse andWalt,
1996). So, the general theoretical claim is that the presence of
multiple donors and lack of coordination negatively impact efﬁ-
ciency. Bigsten (2006) states that, in the presence of donor frag-
mentation, the focus of donor governments shifts to keeping the
aid ﬂowing rather than focusing on deployment's efﬁciency. Thus,
Platteau (2004) observes that while a sole donor can inﬂuence a
local leader, when there are many donors, competition to inﬂuence
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ciaries. In addition, donors may free ride off the efforts of others by
claiming credit (Bigsten, 2006).
O'Connell and Soludo (2001) construct indirect measures to
assess the impact of lack of coordination among donors on trans-
action costs. Using a Herﬁndahl concentration index, their results
suggest that aid to Africa was more dispersed and likely to result in
higher transaction costs, thus lowering efﬁciency. A related issue is
also highlighted by Knack and Rahman (2007), who claim that the
cost of donor proliferation is a 15%e30% reduction in aid due to the
hiring of donor country contractors. Predictions from their model
imply that bureaucratic quality will erode more for recipients with
greater donor fragmentation, showing a signiﬁcant impact in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
In the area of operations management, the research that links
donor fragmentation and operational efﬁciency is scarce. The
closest work is Besiou et al. (2014) that study earmarked funding
and how it causes a negative impact on disaster response programs
in decentralized settings.
Nevertheless, a small pool of literature studies the downsides of
donor concentration, where donor fragmentation could be more
beneﬁcial to recipient countries (Munro, 2005). In fact, fragmen-
tation may contribute to increasing the provision of the public
good, if donors can employ conditional aid contracts to inﬂuence
domestic policy in the recipient country (Torsvik, 2005). Brown and
Swiss (2013) highlight a possible negative consequence of donor
concentration as donors quit countries to concentrate their efforts
on fewer countries without appropriate coordination i.e., the cre-
ation of aid orphans (i.e. countries that are abandoned by donors).
They also suggest that donors might face a “donor cartel” in their
negotiations.
There is a small stream of literature that claims that donor
concentration might lead to reduced negotiation power by recip-
ient countries. Decisions by donors reﬂect their sovereign interests
in the area of trade ﬂows, terrorism, or migrant ﬂows and may not
lead to coverage of country requirements (Schulz, 2009). Also do-
nors expect recipient countries to support donor interests in in-
ternational politics by tradingmorewith donors and this constrains
recipient country choices (Bandyopadhyay and Vermann, 2013).
In this study we posit that the logistics of delivery could be
negatively impacted by fragmentation due to prioritization and
attention paid to speciﬁc ﬂows. We also expect that a focus on the
required steps to follow throughwith partners to inﬂuence use, and
thus impact CPR, may be negatively impacted by donor fragmen-
tation. We therefore test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. RH country programs with larger donor fragmenta-
tion (i.e. low funding concentration) have lower managerial efﬁciency.
Our results will provide an empirical measure of the impact of
donor fragmentation on efﬁciency.
4. Data sources
The proposed methodology is applied to a publicly available
data set: the Reproductive Health Interchange (RHI) data. This data
is collected and made available by the Reproductive Health Sup-
plies Coalition at the website (http://www.myaccessrh.org/rhi-
home). The site provides information regarding RH purchase or-
ders and associated donors funding the orders for each country.
This permits us to capture the timing, volume and content data for
all purchases, as well as the associated lead time from order to
delivery.
Our RHI data set is composed of 44 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries with 2012 data on RH product orders and shipment infor-
mation. We have ﬁltered data to consider all orders with a receiptdate in 2012. This is the latest year with most complete data ac-
counting for a total of 871 different orders. We have purposely
created a cross-sectional data set of one year because this is the
standard length of a funding round and it is the time used to
benchmark and evaluate program performance, while at the same
time assuring that the environmental conditions remain constant.
Each country's landed costs, timeliness and funding concentration
were obtained using the RHI data set. Our data set also includes
country level data regarding environmental variables and CPR from
sources such as the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations (UN).5. Methodology
We apply the three-stage framework used by Liu and Tone
(2008) with a few variations (online supplement Figure S1). Stage
1 of this method runs a DEA model with the appropriately chosen
set of input and output variables. The efﬁciency scores obtained in
stage 1 capture the effects of all sorts of efﬁciency drivers, but the
objective is to isolate the managerial efﬁciency from other drivers.
To do so, the slack values of the inefﬁcient DMUs are extracted. In
stage 2, these slack values are used to run a SFA model and to
decompose the effect of inefﬁciency between three different cau-
ses: environmental, random shocks and managerial. In stage 3, the
output variables are adjusted for the environmental factors and
random shocks and the DEA model is run again. Stage 3 results
allow us to identify managerially efﬁcient countries as well as the
associated reference sets for inefﬁcient countries. Ourmethodology
employes a different DEA technique than the one suggested by Liu
and Tone (2008) and we employ an additional tuning technique for
readjusting the output variables prior to stage 3 suggested by Tone
and Tsutsui (2006).
As noted before, each DMU of our analysis is represented by the
set of managers that run each country-level RH program. We used
the Open Source DEA (OSDEA-GUI) to run DEA, and Stata with
sfcross command to run SFA (Belotti et al., 2013).5.1. Stage 1: initial DEA analysis
In stage 1 and stage 3 of our methodology, we use the Slack-
based Measure output-oriented model of DEA under variable
returns to scale (SBM-O-V) approach. SBM is preferred because it
directly minimizes slacks (i.e. input excess and/or output shortage),
is unit-invariant for the different input and output variables, and is
monotonically decreasing in each input and output slack (Cooper
et al., 2007). Variable returns to scale is assumed since we sus-
pect that not all instances of input increments will results in pro-
portional changes in outputs. We use an output-oriented model to
ﬁnd ways to maximize output performance (i.e., minimize output
shortage) given ﬁxed input values. The corresponding optimization
model that estimates the efﬁciency of each DMU (j), using standard
approaches, can be expressed as follows:
min
lj
!
; sj
!r

j ¼
1
1þ 1n
Pn
i¼1sij
.
yij
(1)
xhj 
Xm
j0¼1
xhj0lj0j;ch ¼ 1;…; l (2)
yij ¼
Xm
j0¼1
yij0lj0j  sij;ci ¼ 1;…;n (3)
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j0¼1
lj0j ¼ 1 (4)
lj
!
; sj
! 0; (5)
where rj is the optimal efﬁciency value (or score) of country j,
parameter xhj is the h-th input quantity of the DMU at hand,
parameter yij is the i-th output quantity of the DMU at hand, de-
cision vector (lj
!
) is the intensity vector and decision variable sij is
the slack variable of i-th output to the DMU in hand. One
assumption of the model is that yij  0, c i. The objective function
of the model (1) is a fractional equation where the efﬁciency score
of DMU j is represented to be inversely related to the sum of inef-
ﬁcient indicators (slacks) of each output i. The sets of constraints (2)
and (3) deﬁne input and output values of j, where the slack vari-
ables of all outputs are explicitly deﬁned. Constraint (4) imposes
the condition to introduce variable returns to scale.5.2. Stage 2: SFA analysis
As described earlier, environmental variables refer to endowed
variables for a country that the programmanager cannot change. To
this end, our environmental variables describe macroeconomic and
market conditions in a country. In addition, the data used in DEA
empirical studies typically involve noise and this is controlled by
separating for statistical noise. We assume that the observed in-
efﬁciency effect (sij=yij) is a function of the true managerial in-
efﬁciency (bsij=byij), environmental factors (f ðenvÞ) and the effects of
statistical noise (v), where sij=yij ¼ bsijbyij þ f ðenvÞ þ v. Thus, we
follow Liu and Tone (2008) to formulate the cost frontier model as
follows:
sij
yij
¼ bio þ
XK
k¼1
biklnzkj þ vij þ uij; (6)
where bio is the intercept, bik is the coefﬁcient estimate of the
regression, zkj is the k-th observable environmental factor of DMU j-
th, vij represents the statistical noise (i.e. idiosyncratic random
shocks), and uij represents the managerial inefﬁciency (bsij=byij). The
model assumes that vij  Nð0; s2vij Þ.
Heteroscedasticity is very likely to appear in both types of errors
(vij and uij). Thus, to correct for this issue we use the doubly het-
eroscedastic SFA model by employing the speciﬁcation designed by
Hadri (1999) that assumes uij  Nþð0; s2uij Þ to deﬁne the variances of
v and u as the following variance equations s2vij ¼ s2v expðd
0
iWjÞ and
s2uij ¼ s2uexpðg
0
iPjÞ, in which W and P are matrices that contain re-
gressors that explain the variance behavior (i.e. variance re-
gressors). From Kumbhakar (2003), these variables cannot be
correlated with the environmental variables in Z.
In Table 1 we list the environmental variables that were ﬁrst
introduced in section 3.2. In addition, population and density are
the two variables selected as variance regressors for the random
shock error, where population has been selected since hetero-
scedasticity in the symmetric error component is usually related to
the size of the DMUs. The variance regressor for the managerial
inefﬁciency error is a popular measure of funding concentration
based on the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Knack and
Rahman, 2007). Other potential primal and variance regressors
have been considered but later discarded either to avoid overﬁtting
or due to being strongly correlated with some of the current primal
regressors violating Kumbhakar (2003) correlation's caveat. All
independent variables are described in Table 1 and some of themare further described in Appendix A. Summary statistics of all in-
dependent variables are provided in the online supplement
(Table S2).
After the estimations, it is straightforward to derive the re-
siduals (εij ¼ sij=yij  bio 
PK
k¼1biklnzkj), which are the estimates of
the error terms vij þ uij. However, the decomposition into separate
error components is more challenging. Jondrow et al. (1982) sug-
gest EðujεÞ ¼ sL
1þL2
 
f

εL
s

1F

εL
s
 εL=s! as the point estimate to draw
inferences about the managerial inefﬁciency component (u) of a
half-normal distribution. L ¼ su=sv, s2 ¼ s2u þ s2v , and Fð,Þ and
fð,Þ are the standard normal cumulative distribution and density
functions, respectively. We implement this extensively used pro-
cedure to decompose the residuals.
5.3. Stage 3: ﬁnal DEA analysis
Since we have an estimate of the impact of environmental var-
iables and shocks, we readjust the initial output values and run the
SBM-V-O DEAmodel again. This step will get us a level playing ﬁeld
for countries because it will control for the uncontrollable variables.
We recalibrate the output values by accounting for the environ-
mental effects and random shocks from the initial values to obtain
the adjusted output variables
yaij ¼ yijð1þ bio þ
PK
k¼1biklnzkj þ vijÞ ¼ yij
 
1þ sijyij  uij
!
.
Additionally, Tone and Tsutsui (2006) propose a tuning formula
that we apply to yaij, y
A
ij ¼
max
j
yijmin
j
yij
min
j
yaijminj y
a
ij
ðyaij minjyaijÞ þminjyij. This
method preserves the same ranking of the adjusted variables and
keeps the same range of the original output values.
After adjusting for the environmental variables and random
shocks, we run the DEA optimization model described in (1)e(5).
We employ notation ð,ÞA to indicate that all variables employed in
this model refer to stage 3 new readjusted values.
6. Empirical analysis
In this section, we provide the numerical results obtained from
running the model and we test whether our hypotheses are sup-
ported by our results.
6.1. Numerical results
We ran the three stage approach with our data set described
earlier. The initial DEA results, in stage 1 of our analysis, show that
seven countries are on the efﬁcient frontier (refer to the second
column of Table B.1). The rest of countries are considered inefﬁcient
and DEA provides a summary of the gap, where gap is described as
the current performance against a “best practice” performance by
individual variable. In contrast, the ﬁnal results obtained from our
data set state that four of the seven efﬁcient countries in stage 1
remain efﬁcient at the end of stage 3 and there are seven new
efﬁcient countries (see the third column of Table B.1). These results
suggest that some of the observed country level inefﬁciency can be
attributed to environmental variables and random shocks. Thus, in
Table 2, we observe that after adjusting for the environmental and
statistical noise inﬂuences, the mean efﬁciency scores of countries
improve while dispersion declines. This means that some of the
variation in efﬁciency across countries can be explained by their
heterogeneity of environmental variables and random shocks. In
Table 1
Independent variables.
Environmental variables
- GDP per capita - gross domestic product divided by midyear population
- Female literacy rate - % female adults (ages 15 and above) who can read and write
- Landlock - dummy variable for landlocked countries
- Public health expenditure - % of public health expenditure from total health expenditure
- LPI - Logistics Performance Index
- Merchandise - % of sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the GDP
Variance regressors for random shocks
- Population - total number of persons inhabiting a country
- Density - midyear population divided by land area in square kilometers
Variance regressors for managerial inefﬁciency
- Funding concentration - sum of squares of market shares of the funding organizations
Table 2
Comparison of initial and ﬁnal efﬁciency scores and slacks.
DEA stage 1 DEA stage 3
Efﬁciency CPR slack Timeliness slack Efﬁciency CPR slack Timeliness slack
Mean 0.535 28.456 15.864 0.870 3.847 8.558
St. dev. 0.263 17.512 15.916 0.198 7.658 12.441
Minimum 0.025 0 0 0.031 0 0
Maximum 1 53.407 73 1 40.130 53.112
Table 3
Stochastic Frontier Estimation results.
CPR slacks Supply timeliness slacks
Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error
Environmental variables
Constant 16.181*** 1.877 0.655 0.651
GDP 0.104 0.151 0.002 0.026
Female literacy 2.984*** 0.374 0.038 0.051
Landlock 0.147 0.257 0.363*** 0.139
Public health 1.552*** 0.281 0.180** 0.083
LPI 0.635** 0.295 0.261*** 0.056
Merchandise 1.351*** 0.305 0.136* 0.073
Variance regressors for random shocks (v)
Population 0.643*** 0.198 2.942*** 0.144
Density 0.800*** 0.225 0.859*** 0.228
Variance regressors for managerial inefﬁciency (u)
Funding concentration 12.201* 6.298 22.351*** 7.870
L 0.333 N/A 0.014 N/A
EðsuÞ 0.376 N/A 0.041 N/A
Log-L 60.943 N/A 43.220 N/A
Observations 44 N/A 44 N/A
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due to exogenous effects. Table B.1 shows the comparison between
the initial and ﬁnal country efﬁciency rankings.
The test for absence of heteroscedasticity in the regressions of
both slacks gives small Chi square values, indicating that the
speciﬁcation of our model that corrects for heteroscedasticity has
been effective. This is also corroborated by visual observation of the
plots of the ﬁtted values with the error terms. Furthermore, we
discard endogeneity issues with the environmental variables (re-
gressors) because there is no risk of reverse causality issues with
the slack values due to the exogenous nature of these regressor
variables. Other potential endogeneity issues are studied in Section
7.
The signs of the signiﬁcant results for random shocks are all as
predicted. In particular, under random shock errors (vij), the size of
a country impacts the variance of statistical noise in both output
slacks. In other words, larger populated countries have signiﬁcantly
larger variances in random shocks related to CPR and supply
timeliness slacks than small countries. On the other hand, density
has a negative relationship with the variance of random shock er-
rors for both CPR and supply timeliness slack variables. The value of
L for CPR slacks is relatively close to 1 indicating that the slacks are
equally related to random shocks and managerial inefﬁciencies. In
contrast, the value of L for supply timeliness slacks is small in
magnitude, and this indicates that the managerial inefﬁciency
impact is smaller than the one related to random errors.6.2. Discussion of hypothesis 1
As support for hypothesis 1, we direct attention to the results in
Table 3, which shows the SFA results by running regression equa-
tion (6) at stage 2. All of our environmental variable regressors have
signiﬁcant estimated coefﬁcients for one or both slacks, with the
exception of GDP per capita, which is not signiﬁcant. The signs of all
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are consistent with expected behavior,
except the sign of merchandise trade. In interpreting the signs,
please note that the left hand sides of the regression focus on the
slack associatedwith the variable, with a larger slack representing a
greater distance to the efﬁcient frontier.
The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10%, 5%and 1% or better, respectively.
While public health expenditure is signiﬁcant for both output
variables, GDP per capita is not a signiﬁcant variable in our analysis.
This is aligned with the WHO report (Evans et al., 2001; WHO,
2000), that claimed that the possible income per capita impact
on health outcomes is not direct and it is only existent via the
health expenditure effect (section 3.2).
Female literacy is the most signiﬁcant socio-economic factor
affecting CPR in our study and, understandably, it has no effect on
lead time performance. This is a key socio-economic factor that
directly inﬂuences improvements in RH as noted while motivating
our hypothesis 1 (section 3.2). Similarly, another expected result
from our analysis states that the logistics performance index (LPI) is
signiﬁcant for both operational process performance (timeliness
slack) and health outcome (CPR slack). Note that LPI is a composite
of different drivers related to the logistics capability of a country
(Appendix A).
One advantage of our methodology is that it allows us to posit all
environmental variables to inﬂuence performance without prior
knowledge of the directions of their impacts on the output slacks. In
G. Berenguer et al. / Journal of Operations Management 45 (2016) 30e4336this regard, our results are as expected for all our variables except for
merchandise tradewhere, surprisingly, there is a negative signiﬁcant
relationship betweenmerchandise trade and timeliness and CPR.We
can ﬁnd a reason for this effect in Dani Rodrik's work related to trade
policy and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. This research
claims that an excessive emphasis on trade liberalization can backﬁre
on economic growth if the scarce resources of local governments are
not directed to the right measures (Rodrik, 1998). For developing
countries, a larger merchandise trade percentage might imply larger
imports raises than export raises causing an imbalance in trade and
payments. This can constraint economic growth and living standards
(Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall, 2004), where the demand of RH
commodities might be directly impacted.
Our empirical results highlight that environmental conditions
and random shocks play an important role in evaluating RH country
level efﬁciency in the Sub-Saharan region and should be taken into
consideration. Once the analysis accounts for these factors, the
purportedly inefﬁcient countries appear to do the best they can given
their endowed parameters. This does not mean that improving the
values of the environmental parameters should not be a goal, but
rather, in the short term, such changes cannot be expected to
materialize and are not the direct responsibility of the DMUs.
6.3. Discussion of hypothesis 2
Wenext focus on hypothesis 2 by examining Table 3which shows
that under inefﬁcient managerial errors (uij), countries with high
funding concentration (i.e., fewer donors) have signiﬁcantly smaller
managerial inefﬁcient error variances in both CPR and supply
timeliness slacks. In other words, countries with a higher funding
concentration are linked to less managerial inefﬁciency variance for
both output variables. We next examine summary statistics to check
if these results are indicators of a possible inﬂuence of funding
concentration on managerial inefﬁciency. The correlation between
stage 3 efﬁciency scores and funding concentrations is 0.680 and
there is a signiﬁcant negative correlation of0.659 between funding
concentration and supply timeliness slacks and a negative correla-
tion of 0.498 with respect to CPR slacks. Fig. 1 depicts a scatter plot
of this relationship. Additionally, we can see an impact of funding
concentration on efﬁciency, where for the set of efﬁcient countries
the funding concentration has mean ¼ 0.956 and st. dev. ¼ 0.076,
while for the set of inefﬁcient countries these values are
mean ¼ 0.585 and st. dev. ¼ 0.215. While this provides statistical
support to state that we cannot reject hypothesis 2, in order to
formally accept this hypothesis, we perform some robustness andFig. 1. Objective values and funding concentration (HHI) of the 44 countries.endogeneity checks in the next section.
7. Robustness and causality checks
We conduct robustness checks to strengthen and support our
hypotheses. First, we use a different deﬁnition of our measure of
funding concentration to test whether the results remain signiﬁ-
cant. Second, we regress with other environmental regressors that
we did not include in the previous section. And third, we run ex-
periments for years 2011 and 2010. Next, we corroborate the causal
relationship between funding concentration and efﬁciency while,
at the same time, we test to rule out possible drivers of efﬁciency
that could compete with funding concentration. These possible
drivers are the level of dominance of a speciﬁc donor and the size of
the country.
7.1. Alternative deﬁnition of funding concentration
The most common alternative deﬁnition of funding concentra-
tion to the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is simply the number
of donors that participate in the country's program (Knack and
Rahman, 2007). This measure reduces the effect of the relative dif-
ferences between each donor's funding shares. The value range and
direction of this measure are also different than that of the HHI
measure, where the larger this measure value is the less funding
concentration. The correlation between HHI and this new measure
is 0.75. Estimation results using this alternative proxy of funding
concentration provide very similar estimates in stage 2. Thismeasure
remains statistically signiﬁcant as the variance regressor of inefﬁ-
cient managerial errors, where high funding concentration (i.e.,
lower number of donors) have signiﬁcantly smaller error variances in
both CPR and supply timeliness slacks (online supplement Table S3).
Furthermore, efﬁciency scores in stage 3 using this alternative
measure of funding concentration have a correlation coefﬁcient of
0.95 with the efﬁciency scores obtained using HHI as the funding
concentration measure and a correlation factor of 0.07 with stage 1
efﬁciency scores. This indicates that our main results that support
hypothesis 1 and 2 remain robust to this perturbation.
7.2. Other environmental regressors
Due to the size of the sample and potential overﬁtting issues, we
have used a reduced but representative set of environmental re-
gressors. In order to show the robustness of the SFA results to the
inﬂuence of environmental factors, we provide the stage 2 results
obtained from employing some alternative environmental vari-
ables popular in the global health literature. In particular, we show
results employing the Gini coefﬁcient, instead of the female literacy
rate (the correlation between these two variables is 0.56) and the
corruption index instead of the GDP per capita (the correlation
between these two variables is 0.37). The major results related to
our hypotheses remain unaltered. Both regression tables are pro-
vided in the online supplement (Tables S4 and S5).
7.3. Other years
Repeating the empirical study for other years has allowed us to
verify that our hypotheses are also robust throughout time. From the
same data sources described in Section 4 we have created the cor-
responding data sets for years 2011 and 2010 (most of the macro-
economic values for 2013 are not published yet). hypothesis 1 is
tested and corroborated for both years, where multiple coefﬁcients
are signiﬁcant with the same sign as our results for the 2012 data set.
In addition, the mean efﬁciency scores from stage 1 to stage 3
improve while dispersion declines for both years. Related to
Table 4
OLS regressions with managerial efﬁciency as the dependent variable.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error
HHI 0.557*** 0.088 0.612*** 0.142
UNFPA 0.264*** 0.082 0.065 0.096
Population 0.060*** 0.019 0.002 0.020
R-squared 0.490 N/A 0.197 N/A 0.192 N/A 0.495 N/A
Note: we are using log(population) as the proxy of size.
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onmanagerial efﬁciency, where the correlation coefﬁcients between
stage 3 efﬁciency scores andHHI are positivewith a value of 0.633 for
the 2011 data set and 0.262 for the 2010 data set. More details of the
2010 and 2011 experiments are available upon request.7.4. Tests to corroborate the causality relationship between funding
concentration and efﬁciency
In order to accept hypothesis 2, we need to study possible
endogeneity issues between funding concentration (HHI) and stage
3 efﬁciency scores (i.e. each country's managerial efﬁciency). One
might argue that from the obvious correlation of these two vari-
ables it can not be asserted that low funding concentration is a
direct cause of managerial inefﬁciency and that this relationship
could actually be mainly due to the opposite effect in which the
distribution of donor share per country is a consequence of a
country's managerial efﬁciency. To prove the causal relationship
stated in hypothesis 2we run a linear OLS regression between these
two variables, where HHI is the independent variable and mana-
gerial efﬁciency the dependent variable (Model 1 of Table 4). This
relationship is signiﬁcant at the 1% level and the regressor is un-
correlated with the error term of this regression providing no ev-
idence of endogeneity issues in this relationship.
Furthermore, one could think that instead of funding concen-
tration, the underlying driver of managerial efﬁciency is the level of
dominance of a speciﬁc donor (i.e. proportion of share of funds of a
speciﬁc donor with respect to others). We next look at the nature of
this fundingmix per each country. Fig. 2 shows this mix for our 2012
RHI data set where there are two major funding organizations the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the rest of them only
represent around 11% of overall donations. UNFPA has a larger
presence in small and less populated countries, where the overall
need of funds can be solely covered by this funding organization. On
the other hand, USAID's presence is in medium and large size Sub-
Saharan countries and it is always shared with other donors (on-
line supplement Table S6). Since UNFPA and USAID presence is
substitutive (both vectors of shares have a correlation of 0.9), we
only analyze the inﬂuence of UNFPA presence related to managerial
efﬁciency and funding concentration. The correlation coefﬁcient of
the share of UNFPA per country with efﬁciency is 0.493. This might
imply that UNFPA practices with in-country managers program
managers lead to efﬁciency but there is also a strong positive cor-
relation (0.814) between funding concentration (HHI) and the share
of UNFPA per country. Indeed, there is a causal relationship between
UNFPA share and managerial efﬁciency (Model 2 of Table 4). For this
reason, one could posit that the causal relationship between HHI and
managerial efﬁciency is indirect and occurs through the causal
relationship between UNFPA and managerial efﬁciency. Likewise, a
strong correlation can also be observed with the size of the country
(Model 3 of Table 4). We only need to regress all three variables
together to corroborate the direct causal relationship betweenfunding concentration and managerial efﬁciency and discard the
possible competing relationships related to UNFPA share and coun-
try's size with managerial efﬁciency (Model 4 of Table 4).
8. Benchmarking process: learning from best practices
The ﬁnal DEA analysis provides information that allows us to
group DMUs in reference sets for benchmarking. Section 8.1 pro-
vides the details on how to build these sets. For each set, Section 8.2
suggests a supply chain framework to provide guidance on how to
derive the most appropriate best practices. Finally, Section 8.3 il-
lustrates this benchmarking process with two countries.
8.1. Reference and extended reference sets
For each country not on the efﬁcient frontier, an output shortfall
(sAij) for each of the output variables, CPR and timeliness, is gener-
ated. This variable is deﬁned as sAij ¼
Pm
j0¼1yAij0l
A
j0 j  yAij  0, where i is
related to the output variable. Intuitively, the magnitude of this
shortfall suggests the opportunity for improvement by describing
the maximum attainable performance (the frontier) given resource
inputs, outputs, and other determinants that affect the country's
performance. This formula directs the manager to a subset of efﬁ-
cient countries to look at, which are the countries that have a
positive value of lAj0 j, where l
!A
j is the intensity vector. This set of
efﬁcient countries is called the reference set (or peer set) of DMU j,
and it is formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A reference set of country j is
Ej ¼ fj0
lAj0 j >0; j02ð1;…;mÞg.
Reference sets are useful to program managers of countries that
are considered to be inefﬁcient because they are a good source of
best practices. Table B.2 provides the reference set and intensity
component values per each country. Nonetheless, in practice and
given hypothesis 1, having similar environmental conditions is a
factor that can be included to provide a more useful reference set to
the practitioner of the country at hand:
 Practitioners might prefer to learn from other countries in the
efﬁcient frontier than the countries in their reference set if the
former countries have closer environmental conditions to the
country at hand.
 Furthermore, not only efﬁcient countries can be useful refer-
ences. At times, other inefﬁcient countries closer to the efﬁcient
frontier than the country at hand that have similar environ-
mental conditions could be more useful references.
 If the country at hand is already efﬁcient it should also sustain
and try to improve its efﬁciency level. In this case, suggesting a
reference for this efﬁcient country can be useful.
To provide a ﬂexible deﬁnition of reference sets that in-
corporates these additional aspects, we have deﬁned extended
reference sets for each country as follows.
Fig. 2. Pie chart of 2012 RHI data set donor share (HHI). Note: Besides UNFPA and
USAID, the rest of organizations in the chart are IPPF (International Planned Parent-
hood Federation), DFID (U.K. Department for International Development), and Others
includes organizations such as the country's Ministry of Health, the Global Fund, the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Marie Stopes International (MSI),
DKT International, PSI and the German Development Bank (KFW).
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extðEjÞ ¼ Ej∪
8<:~j

sA
i~j
yA
i~j
 s
A
ij
yAij
ci and dðj;~jÞ3 dðj; j0Þcj02Ej
9=;, where
dðj;bjÞ2Rn and each component of this vector is the euclidean distance
between DMU j and bj ﬁtted values of stage 2 regression
(diðj;bjÞ ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPKk¼1b2ikðlnzkj  lnzkbjÞ2
r
).
Deﬁnition 3 An extended reference set of an efﬁcient country j is
extðEjÞ ¼ argminf
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPI
i¼1diðj;~jÞ2
q
c~j in the efficient frontier except jg.
Table B.2 shows the DMUs that are added to the reference set to
compose the extended reference set for each country. For example,
Rwanda has been added in the extended reference set of Malawi.
This is because Rwanda, despite being an inefﬁcient country, is
closer to the efﬁcient frontier than Malawi and Rwanda's envi-
ronmental variables are closer to Malawi than the ones of its
reference set (Lesotho and Sudan). This can be a useful addition
because Malawi's RH program managers might be able to learn
more from Rwanda's RH program's best practices than from Leso-
tho's and Sudan's. As expected, countries with a lower efﬁciency
score or similar environmental characteristics than others have a
larger extended reference set.5 Due to Botswana's relative proximity to the efﬁcient frontier and its relative
similarity in terms of environmental conditions with its countries in the reference
set, the extended reference set remains the same as its reference set.
6 a platform for donor coordination, alignment, and harmonization created by
the Government of Lesotho and some of its partners.
7 Christian Health Associations of Lesotho.
8 the National Drug Supply Organization.8.2. Benchmarking process
Any country trying to improve performance has to ﬁgure out
concrete steps, both process and system based.We suggest a supply
chain framework, such as the one described in Kretschmer et al.
(2014) for school feeding programs across less-developed coun-
tries, to help systematically identify concrete steps for process
improvement. Kretschmer et al. (2014) classify each country's
program as Centralized, Decentralized or Semi decentralized, and
whether or not the programs were insourced or outsourced.
However, for the context of RH programs, we suggest a focus on the
extent of coordination, instead of centralization. Their paper de-
scribes external factors and internal factors to understand the logic
for the choice of supply chain structure and its alignment with
goals. Our deﬁnition of environmental variables is similar to their
deﬁnition of external factors and the aggregate efﬁciency of their
internal factors is captured by our quantitative measure of mana-
gerial efﬁciency. So, at the benchmarking step, and given that
managerial efﬁciency scores do not account for environmental
factors, the focus of this process should only be on internal supplychain factors. In the next section, we foreshadow an approach to
learning for benchmarking by using this suggested supply chain
framework in the context of two countries, Botswana (inefﬁcient)
and Lesotho (efﬁcient).8.3. Case study: Lesotho and Botswana
Botswana and Lesotho are landlocked countries in southern
Africa with a similar population of 2.1 million people and 2 million
people, respectively. Both countries are among the countries with
the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the world. While Botswana is
considered a middle-income country (GNI per capita US $7480 in
2011) with a stable and democratically elected government,
Lesotho is classiﬁed as a lower middle income country (GNI per
capita US $1220 in 2011). If we look at the stage 1 efﬁciency scores
of these two countries (in Table B.1), Botswana has a 72.08% score
while Lesotho's score is slightly lower at 68.5%. Yet, after adjusting
for environmental conditions and random shocks, our empirical
analysis situates Lesotho on the efﬁciency frontier, and Botswana as
a managerially inefﬁcient country with an estimated efﬁciency of
70.5%. Botswana's reference set includes Lesotho with an 84.9%
weight in the projection to the frontier and the remaining 15.1%
weigh assigned to the other country in its reference set, Sudan (see
Table B.2).5 Given that Lesotho is the dominant reference of
Botswana, we provide an evaluation of both countries' general
health care and RH structural and operational managerial initia-
tives. This analysis brieﬂy explores an approach to learning that
could trigger process oriented steps for Botswana to generate better
outcomes for the same level of funding.8.3.1. Can Botswana learn from Lesotho?
By following our suggested benchmarking framework (8.2), a
summary of the differences between Lesotho and Botswana supply
chain and operational initiatives is shown in Table 5. It suggests that
despite both countries dealing with multiple RH donors, Lesotho
follows a well-deﬁned coordination strategy via the Development
Partners Consultative Forum (DPCF)6 while Botswana does not have
an entity or forum with this clearly deﬁned goal Report (2011).
Similarly, public-private partnerships (PPPs), procurement, and the
logistics of commodity and information ﬂows seem to be func-
tioning well in Lesotho. This is thanks to the following respective
mechanisms: private health clinics and hospitals (CHALs)7 inte-
grated with the government facilities via Standard Operating Pro-
cedures (SOPs), a procurement coordinator (NDSO),8 and a well-
functioning Logistics Management Information System (LMIS)
system. In Botswana there is an LMIS, but information ﬂow from
health facilities is not robust (Brown, 2013). This is due to its new
supply chain structure (set up in 2010) that transitioned to a more
decentralized model, where health administration in the districts is
the responsibility of District Health Management Teams (DHMTs).
As a result, there is a lack of clarity on how information ﬂows
(Report, 2011).
We suggest that Botswana's health supply chain managers can
explore adjustments to their system by comparing their choices to
Lesotho. Many of these process oriented steps reﬂect choices that
areworth serious consideration. Similar processes could be evolved
Table 5
Summary of the differences in RH supply chain practices in Lesotho and Botswana.
Attribute Coordinated Partly
coordinated
Uncoordinated Lesotho notes Botswana notes
Funding fragmentation Lesotho e Botswana HHI ¼ 0.76 HHI ¼ 0.52
Donor coordination Lesotho e Botswana Well deﬁned roles (DPCF) No clearly deﬁned roles
Public-Private partnerships Lesotho e Botswana CHAL facilities common SOPs Non public facilities not integrated
Procurement Lesotho Botswana e Commodities supplied by
NDSO
Centralized erratic availability CDC
(2008)
Commodity and information
ﬂows
Lesotho Mwase et al.
(2010)
Botswana e LMIS functioning well New DHMT system lacks clarity
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can lead to better supply chain performance and better health care
outcomes. Nevertheless, the success related to continuous
improvement is not automatic after identifying best practices, we
should note that the facilitation of best practice transfer is the key
to success. Our exploration suggests that more detailed data
regarding process based learning to enable efﬁciency improvement
is a working direction to pursue.9. Managerial and policy insights
The empirical analysis and benchmarking process suggested in
this paper present several steps that can be taken to improve the
performance of global health supply chains in Sub-Saharan Africa.
This section complements the previous ones by providing further
managerial and policy insights to the different stakeholders of this
type of supply chains. For further dissemination, a policy paper
targeted to practitioners and related to this academic work has
been created by the authors jointly with the Center for Global
Development (Iyer et al., 2015).9.1. In-country program managers: learning from benchmarking
The benchmarking process presented in Section 8.2 provides a
systematic tool that can help the in-country managers identify best
practices from the extended reference set. While there are some
overall accepted good practices, we should note that other best
practices might work for a few DMUs but not for others. For this
reason, the emphasis should be on following a good benchmarking
technique that can generate recommendations rather than directly
following a list of suggestions. In the ﬁeld of supply chain man-
agement there are some established best practices known to foster
managerial efﬁciency improvement. For example, the use of a
common information system to track all ﬂows regardless of donor
and to coordinate all procurement. In Lesotho, for example, despite
the presence of over 15 donors, an enterprise resource planning
system to track ﬂows and the supply of commodities to health fa-
cilities is done by the NDSO.
Going from the estimate of efﬁciency to improving performance
requires country level participation. In this direction, we expect an
increased use of collaboration across developing countries to
improve outcomes in global health supply chains. There is a plan to
create centers for excellence that would foster such collaboration,
as the current plans for establishing an East African regional center
for excellence in health, vaccines and immunization logistics (in
Rwanda).9 As a way forward, we hope to see exploration of peer
country collaborations at such regional centers of excellence.9 http://venturesafrica.com/rwanda-tasked-with-pioneering-ehealth-for-east-
africa.9.2. Donors: lessening the impact of donor funding fragmentation
Our analysis supports past literature that summarized the
detrimental impact of aid fragmentation on managerial efﬁciency
(Section 3.3). Most importantly, our paper is one of the very few
papers that provides empirical evidence of this claim. The magni-
tude of the coefﬁcients in Table 3 shows the speciﬁc quantitative
impact of this fragmentation on overall managerial efﬁciency. This
result suggests that dealing with the impact of funding fragmen-
tation can permit signiﬁcant beneﬁts to managerial efﬁciency even
with the same level of funding. For the authors, this result is a
pleasant surprise, but also suggests immediate noninfrastructure
solutions to try to improve performance. From our case study,
literature search, and conversations with practitioners, we suggest
the following speciﬁc donor best practices:
 Increase the communication between donors and in-country
program managers of the same country and across countries
in the same region. The creation of the centers of excellence
funded by the donors and described in 9.1 is a good example.
 Increase the communication between different donors without
changing donors' shares. Sarley et al. (2014) describe Coordi-
nated Supply Planning (CSP) - an attempt to coordinate across
donors like UNFPA and USAID to create joint forecasts for
planning shipments and for coordinating with manufacturers.
 Let a large donor or an external integrator represent the in-
terests of the donor community and generate reports used by
others (Kraiselburd and Yadav, 2013). We suggest that the
experience from HIV drug delivery can serve as a guide to
improving performance in the RH delivery space. For example,
PEPFAR and the Global Fund now routinely collaborate to deﬁne
priorities, funding streams and impact measurement. Such an
approach could maintain efﬁciency while permitting the
required number of donors to contribute (Bilimoria, 2012).
 While more difﬁcult to implement, coordination by donors to
focus on speciﬁc countries, based on past collaboration, may
enable increased donor concentration for individual countries
while maintaining the overall aid budgets. These ideas have
been encouraged in the development aid literature and are
termed “division of labor among donors” (Schulz, 2009). Such a
system may well enable longer term planning and thus more
stable processes over time. But it will require coordination be-
tween different donor organizations, as well as between local
governments and international donors, and have seen limited
realization in practice (Brown and Swiss, 2013).9.3. Government actions: improving environmental variables
When examining performance of a supply chain in a country, it is
clear that managers of the health programs have no control over
most environmental factors such as whether a country is landlocked,
G. Berenguer et al. / Journal of Operations Management 45 (2016) 30e4340female literacy levels, merchandise taxes, logistics performance in-
dex (LPI), etc. But as Table 3 shows, each of these factors impacts
efﬁciency by impacting both CPR as well as timeliness. We translate
the most signiﬁcant results to the following recommended actions:
 The potential impact of an improved LPI on timeliness is clear in
our results (Table 3) and has only recently been reported in the
operations management literature. Hausman et al. (2013) show
this result by examining the impact of delays at ports for custom
clearance. For health products a fast track clearance can signif-
icantly reduce inventory in transit and enable higher in stock of
products. In turn, availability of products can impact usage and
drive up CPR as Table 3 shows (negatively-correlated signiﬁ-
cance between LPI and CPR slacks).
 It is also important to invest in public health because this
positively affects both of our output measures (CPR and time-
liness). Besides increasing public health care expenditure all
together, studies such as Evans et al. (2001) claim that reallo-
cating available resources from interventions that are not cost
effective to those that are more cost effective but not fully
implemented can also improve efﬁciencies.
 The signiﬁcance of female literacy for reducing CPR slacks and
thus improving efﬁciency provides a clear message. It suggests
that it is important to educate the population regarding product
use and beneﬁt i.e., generate a demand for products along with a
focus on supply.
Governments could use these results to justify improvements in
infrastructure, investments in public health and education, re-
ductions in unwanted fees and taxes, etc. by claiming that these
actions would generate health related beneﬁts.
10. Conclusions and future research
To our knowledge, our analysis of the RH data set and associated
variables is the ﬁrst cross-country global health benchmarking
study done using a multi-stage DEA/SFA modeling technique. By
providing a methodological framework that uses publicly available
data, this analysis can be replicated for other contexts such as
different types of cross-country global health programs and
different geographical locations. In particular, our analysis of RH
programs in Sub-Saharan Africa sheds some interesting insights.
First, we observe that in evaluating managerial efﬁciency at the
country level performance should be adjusted to reﬂect the impact
of uncontrollable parameters. In other words, a country with a poor
network of public hospitals cannot be compared to one with a
modern public hospital network, thus its observed performance
has to be handicapped for this difference. Once such external pa-
rameters are adjusted for, what remains are management
controlled parameters, fromwhich we can calculate the managerial
efﬁciency of each country's set of RH programs. Furthermore, our
analysis permits countries to be grouped into reference sets and
extended reference sets, where the latter is a new notion designed
to ensure a larger and more useful pool of benchmarking partners
with similar environmental conditions. A supply chain framework
approach is foreshadowed as a useful benchmarking process that
can generate process based ideas for improvement.
We investigate the quantitative impact of some factors on efﬁ-
ciency to come up with useful managerial and policy recommen-
dations. First, we provide information related to the impact of
countries' socio-economic factors on efﬁciency. Our results state that,
from our pool of environmental variables, public health expenditure
and female literacy are the most signiﬁcant factors that affect the
uptake of modern contraceptives. On the other hand, the logistics
capabilities of a country and public health expenditure are the mostsigniﬁcant parameters inﬂuencing lead time. In this regard, our re-
sults are aligned with other empirical work that links policy making
decisions with health and logistics outcome performance. Second,
we ﬁnd that funding concentration is a signiﬁcant variable that
positively inﬂuences managerial performance affecting delivery ef-
ﬁciency and RH outcomes. This result is a relevant contribution
because evidence of such claim has barely been empirically studied.
We suggests many different ways for donors and recipient countries
to mitigate the detrimental impact of aid fragmentation.
Many research questions beyond those addressed in this paper
may be answered using similar data sets. For example, one could
run an input-oriented three-stage DEA/SFA model to focus on
ﬁnding ways to optimize the allocation of donations (by mini-
mizing the input excess) given ﬁxed supply timeliness and CPR
values. This problem setting is related to the donor's aid redistri-
bution problem also known as the allocative efﬁciency problem.
Another aspect to be studied is the learning effect of efﬁciency
through different years using panel data.
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Appendix A. Variable Descriptions
Input and output variables in DEA analysis
Landed costs per capita: the value in the RHI includes all landed
costs, i.e. product unit or acquisition cost, freight costs, insurance
costs, any sampling and testing costs and any service costs. We
divide this quantity with 2012 population. Units: Current U.S $ per
capita. Data source: RHI data set.
Supply timeliness: the difference in days between the
maximum transit delay value across all DMUs and the transit delay
for that particular country, where transit delay (TD) is the number
of days between shipping date and actual receipt date.
supply timelinessj ¼ maxkTDk  TDj, where
TDk ¼ receipt datek  shipping datek Units: Days. Data source: RHI
data set. Data exception: Value for the country with maximum
delay is 1 to avoid zero values.
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR): the proportion of
women of reproductive age (from 15 to 49 age) married or in a
union and who are currently using (or whose partner is using) a
modern contraceptive method. Units: % of total women population
of reproductive age. Data source: World Contraceptive Use 2012
(model-based estimates).
Independent Variables in SFA analysis
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita: the sum of gross
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation
of natural resources. Units: Current U.S $. Data source: World Bank.
Female literacy rate: total is the percentage of the female pop-
ulation age 15 and above (’adult’) who can, with understanding, read
G. Berenguer et al. / Journal of Operations Management 45 (2016) 30e43 41and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally,
literacy also encompasses numeracy, the ability to make simple
arithmetic calculations. Units: % of total female ‘adult’ population.
Data source: World Bank (the World Development Indicators).
Public Health expenditure: recurrent and capital spending
from government budgets, external borrowing and grants
(including donations from international agencies and NGOs), and
social health insurance funds. Units: % of total health expenditure,
where total health expenditure is the sum of public and private
health expenditure. It covers the provision of health services, family
planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid desig-
nated for health but does not include provision of water and sani-
tation. Data source: World Bank.
Logistics Performance Index (LPI): reﬂects perceptions of a
country's logistics based on efﬁciency of customs clearance process,
quality of trade- and transport-related infrastructure, ease of ar-
ranging competitively priced shipments, quality of logistics ser-
vices, ability to track and trace consignments, and frequency with
which shipments reach the consignee within the scheduled time.
Units: ranges from 1 to 5, with a higher score representing better
performance. Data source: World Bank.
Merchandise trade: sum of merchandise exports and imports
divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. Units: % of theTable B.1
Stage 1 and 3 score and ranking results.
DMU name Objective Value
Stage 1 (rj )
Angola 0.290
Benin 0.269
Botswana 0.708
Burkina Faso 0.404
Burundi 0.446
Cameroon 0.507
Central African Republic 0.310
Chad 0.214
Comoros 1
Congo, Rep. 0.597
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.025
Cote D'Ivoire 0.334
Djibouti 0.616
Eritrea 1
Ethiopia 0.469
Gabon 0.539
Gambia, The 0.646
Ghana 0.406
Guinea 0.218
Guinea-Bissau 0.444
Kenya 0.721
Lesotho 0.685
Liberia 0.338
Madagascar 0.599
Malawi 0.737
Mali 0.257
Mauritania 1
Mauritius 1
Mozambique 0.298
Namibia 1
Niger 0.301
Nigeria 0.260
Rwanda 0.598
Sao Tome and Principe 0.711
Senegal 0.329
Sierra Leone 0.231
South Africa 1
Sudan 0.328
Swaziland 1
Tanzania 0.631
Togo 0.393
Uganda 0.428
Zambia 0.605
Zimbabwe 0.632GDP. Data source: World Bank.
Density: midyear population divided by land area in square
kilometers. Population is based on the facto deﬁnition of popula-
tion, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or
citizenship-except for refugees not permanently settled in the
country of asylum. Land area is country's total area, excluding area
under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and
exclusive economic zone. Units: any positive number. Data source:
World Bank.
Funding Concentration: sum of squares of fund shares in $
value from each funding organization in a country. It is the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measure applied to describe the
funding mix for a country HHIj ¼
Pnj
h¼1share
2
jh, where
sharejh ¼ landed costs of donor h in country jtotal landed costs in country j and nj : total number of do-
nors in country j. Units: ranges from a 1/N to 1, where N is the
number of funders. Data source: RHI data set.Appendix B. Additional TablesObjective Value Ranking Ranking
Stage 3 ðrj ÞA Stage 1 Stage 3
0.999 37 12
0.937 38 22
0.721 11 3
0.970 28 20
0.930 24 23
0.928 22 24
1 34 1
0.970 43 19
1 1 1
0.996 20 14
0.857 44 30
0.920 31 25
1 16 1
1 1 1
0.831 23 34
0.974 21 18
1 13 1
0.852 27 32
0.494 42 42
0.911 25 26
0.625 9 41
1 12 1
0.890 30 28
0.843 18 33
0.758 8 36
0.987 40 17
1 1 1
1 1 1
0.966 36 21
0.996 1 13
1 35 1
0.281 39 43
0.993 19 15
0.871 10 29
0.908 32 27
1 41 1
0.031 1 44
1 33 1
0.987 1 16
0.823 15 35
0.709 29 40
0.852 26 31
0.727 17 37
0.726 14 38
Table B.2
Reference sets and intensity component values.
DMU name Reference (intensity value) Extended references
Angola Djibouti (0.463), Gambia, The (0.005), Sudan
(0.531)
Mauritania
Benin Comoros (0.220), Lesotho (0.064), Sudan (0.716) Eritrea, Gambia, The, Mauritania, Angola, Mozambique
Botswana Lesotho (0.849), Sudan (0.151) e
Burkina Faso Central African Republic (0.522), Lesotho (0.150),
Sudan (0.328)
Mali
Burundi Central African Republic (0.752), Lesotho (0.248) Rwanda
Cameroon Comoros (0.099), Mauritius (0.704), Niger (0.198) e
Central African
Republic
Central African Republic (1) Gambia, The
Chad Comoros (0.529), Mauritania (0.138), Niger
(0.333)
e
Comoros Comoros (1) Eritrea
Congo, Rep. Mauritius (0.360), Niger (0.640) e
Congo, Dem. Rep. Comoros (0.384), Lesotho (0.211), Sudan (0.405) Cameroon, Eritrea, Mali
Cote D'Ivoire Comoros (0.138), Lesotho (0.196), Sudan (0.666) Angola, Eritrea, Gambia, The, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone
Djibouti Djibouti (1) Comoros
Eritrea Eritrea (1) Djibouti
Ethiopia Lesotho (0.548), Sudan (0.452) Central African Republic, Chad, Niger
Gabon Comoros (0.016), Lesotho (0.119), Sudan (0.865) Mauritius, Namibia
Gambia, The Gambia, The (1) Central African Republic
Ghana Lesotho (0.205), Sudan (0.795) Angola, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Rep., Djibouti, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, The, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia
Guinea Comoros (0.327), Lesotho (0.102), Sudan (0.571) Angola, Benin, Cote D'Ivoire, Eritrea, Gambia, The, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Togo
Guinea-Bissau Comoros (0.584), Lesotho (0.142), Sudan (0.273) Cameroon, Gambia, The
Kenya Lesotho (0.317), Sudan (0.683) Angola, Cameroon, Comoros, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao
Tome and Principe, Tanzania
Lesotho Lesotho (1) Mauritania
Liberia Comoros (0.204), Lesotho (0.285), Sudan (0.510) Angola, Eritrea, Mauritania, Mozambique
Madagascar Lesotho (0.479), Sudan (0.521) Angola, Comoros, Eritrea, Gambia, The, Liberia, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal
Malawi Lesotho (0.687), Sudan (0.313) Rwanda
Mali Comoros (0.013), Lesotho (0.050), Sudan (0.937) Central African Republic, Niger
Mauritania Mauritania (1) Djibouti
Mauritius Mauritius (1) Comoros
Mozambique Central African Republic (0.746), Lesotho (0.150),
Sudan (0.104)
Angola, Eritrea, Gambia, The, Mauritania
Namibia Comoros (0.021), Lesotho (0.002), Sudan (0.977) Mauritius
Niger Niger (1) Gambia, The
Nigeria Comoros (0.516), Lesotho (0.220), Sudan (0.264) Angola, Cote D'Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Togo
Rwanda Central African Republic (0.565), Lesotho (0.036),
Sudan (0.399)
Angola, Eritrea, Gambia, The, Mauritania
Sao Tome and
Principe
Central African Republic (0.531), Lesotho (0.469) Angola, Comoros, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gabon, Liberia, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda,
Sudan
Senegal Central African Republic (0.279), Lesotho (0.387),
Sudan (0.334)
Benin, Gambia, The, Mozambique
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone (1) Gambia, The
South Africa Comoros (0.825), Lesotho (0.175) Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, Tanzania
Sudan Sudan (1) Eritrea
Swaziland Central African Republic (0.899), Lesotho (0.070),
Sudan (0.031)
e
Tanzania Lesotho (0.170), Sudan (0.830) Angola, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Rep., Cote D'Ivoire, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia
Togo Comoros (0.281), Lesotho (0.442), Sudan (0.277) Angola, Benin, Cote D'Ivoire, Eritrea, Gambia, The, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal
Uganda Lesotho (0.542), Sudan (0.458) e
Zambia Lesotho (0.884), Sudan (0.116) Burundi, Uganda
Zimbabwe Lesotho (0.825), Sudan (0.175) e
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